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Abstract   Excessive harvesting pressure is an important force behind the de-
cline of East Africa’s Lake Victoria fisheries. The question of entry-exit is,
therefore, crucial. This paper uses micro-data collected from the Kenyan side of
Lake Victoria to analyze this issue. Results indicate that fishermen are in their
current enterprise because alternatives are lacking. In spite of the “commons”
nature of these fisheries, over two-thirds of the fishermen would welcome more
fishermen, as the positive externalities of this exceed the negative ones. Oppor-
tunity cost of exiting, fishing experience, and whether the skipper of a fishing
unit is its owner or an employee, are the significant determinants of resistance
to exit from these Kenyan fisheries. Exit inertia usually associated with imper-
fect capital malleability and attachment to fishing is lacking, or minimal, in
these fisheries.
Key words   Exit-entry, fisheries, imperfect capital malleability, Kenyan fisher-
ies of Lake Victoria, opportunity cost of exiting, resistance to exit, Willingness
to Accept (WTA) compensation.
Introduction
Of the numerous factors leading to the serious decline of the Kenyan fisheries of
Lake Victoria that have been observed since the 1960s, excessive harvesting pres-
sure is arguably the most important. Harvesting pressure has not only been expanded
by an unprecedented increase in the number of fishermen and fishing vessels, but
also by an enormous increase in the fishing intensity of already existing effort. Sev-
eral forces underlie this escalation of fishing effort and its intensity. These include a high
population growth rate, increasingly limited opportunities for alternative employment,
expanding fish markets in the domestic and external arena, the emergence and rapid ex-
pansion of the fish processing sub-sector, collapse of traditional fishery management
structures, lack of well-defined property rights to replace the collapsed structures,
policy failure and inability of the government to enforce regulatory measures, and
falling fishery productivity (catch per unit of effort) due to unsustainable harvesting
practices and ecological upheavals resulting from these practices and pollution.
Given this background, the question of exit from the fisheries is crucial because
the current level of effort is excessive and cannot be supported by the resource base.
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Means and incentives that can induce exit are required. This paper analyzes the de-
terminants of fisherman resistance to quitting the Kenyan fisheries of Lake Victoria.
These determinants may play a substantial role in the management of these impor-
tant fisheries.
The paper proceeds as follows. It starts with a short description of the fisheries
and a note on the data used. This is followed by an overview of the long-run issue of
entry and exit in these fisheries as a motivation for the model on resistance to exit
that follows. The model is then estimated using econometric tools, and finally, the
results discussed. In this discussion, emphasis is placed on the management implica-
tions of the model results.
The Kenyan Fisheries of Lake Victoria
Kenya is a coastal state, and like other coastal states, has jurisdiction over 200 nau-
tical miles of the ocean from its shore, thanks to the 1982 Law of the Sea Confer-
ence. The country has rich marine resources along its 640-kilometer coastline. Tech-
nological capacity constraints have, however, meant that the potential of these re-
sources has remained largely inaccessible to Kenyans. Thus, marine fisheries con-
tributed only 3% of the 194,000 tons of fish produced in Kenya in 1995, compared
to about 95%, from the lake fisheries.1 Even though the country has several lakes,
Lake Victoria dominates the fishing sector. In 1995, Lake Victoria accounted for
94% of Kenya’s total fish catch.
Fishing makes a small but increasing contribution to Kenya’s GDP. This contri-
bution averaged 0.2% between 1971 and 1981. By 1989/90, however, it had in-
creased to about 2% of the GDP attributable to the nonmonetary economy and to
4.4% of the monetary sector’s GDP. This increase is attributable to the exports of
filleted Nile perch that began in earnest in the mid-1980s. The country earned Kshs
1.5 billion2 in foreign currency from fish exports (excluding earnings from sporting
activities) in 1995. The relatively small contribution to the GDP notwithstanding,
the fishing industry is the lifeline for the Kenyan communities living around Lake
Victoria and the coast. In 1995, the Fisheries Department estimated that 798,000
Kenyans were either directly or indirectly supported by the sector.
Lake Victoria is the world’s second largest freshwater body (after USA’s Lake
Superior), covering a surface area of 68,800 km2. The biological diversity of the
lake has declined from an estimated 350–400 species of fish in the earlier years of
this century, to less than 200 at present (Achieng 1988; Witte and Van Densen
1995). This loss of biodiversity is one manifestation of the decline that has charac-
terized the fishery over the century. The decline has been so severe that the lake
fishery now supports a three-species-only commercial fishery, based on the Nile
perch, Rastrineobola argentea, and the exotic tilapia, Oreochromis niloticus. There
is currently intense pressure to reduce further to a two-species fishery. While the
share of catch volume of exotic tilapia rose to a peak of about 23% in 1990, it
dropped sharply to less than 3% by 1995. Conversely, Nile perch and R. argentea
have experienced literally uninterrupted dominance, with the two species accounting
for about 88% of the lake’s total landings in 1995.
The lake is common property of three East African countries, shared as follows:
Kenya (6%), Uganda (45%), and Tanzania (49%). Each of these countries manages
its portion of the lake independently, so there are different regulatory and enforce-
1 Fisheries Department’s Fisheries Annual Statistical Bulletin.
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ment strategies. However, the recently formed Lake Victoria Environmental Man-
agement Project (LVEMP) aims at the formulation of a unified management and
regulatory framework for the entire lake.
While Kenya’s share of the lake surface area is only 6%, its share of the shore-
line is about 22%, or 760 km. This is the portion of the lake most heavily fished and
commercialized. Thus, it is estimated that Kenya’s share of Lake Victoria’s total
catch of 555,300 tons in 1990 was 33% (Ikiara 1999). Between 1973 and 1995, the
number of fishermen operating on the Kenyan part of the lake increased by 200%,
while that of vessels increased by about 95%. In 1985, it was estimated that about
half of the effort on Lake Victoria was exploiting only 2% of the entire lake surface,
Kenya’s Nyanza Gulf (Ikiara 1999). Rapid population growth, lack of alternative
employment opportunities, the lucrative nature of fishing since the mid-1980s, and
the open-access nature of the lake fisheries have meant that the majority of fishers
are permanent and that the lake fisheries continue absorbing an increasing number
of new fishers every year. Rising demand for fish in domestic and external markets,
relatively better availability of credit from the fish processing and marketing
subsector, falling catch per unit of effort, and rising cost of living have led to expan-
sion of effort from existing harvesters.
The pressure associated with this increase in fishing effort and other factors
poses substantial challenge to the fishery’s capability to maintain a flow of services
to posterity. Already, total fish output from the Kenyan side of the lake has levelled
off (figure 1), while fishing effort continues to expand. Other manifestations of the
stress under which the fisheries have been subjected to include: loss of biodiversity;
declining productivity; increasing juvenile harvest rates; increasing desperation and
use of destructive technology, such as chemical fishing; worsening pollution; and in-
festation of the lake ecosystem by the water hyacinth.
Figure 1.  Quantity of Fish Produced in KenyaIkiara and Odink 202
In Kenya, the lake constitutes the main resource for an area that is highly popu-
lated (290 persons/km2), and there is a very limited alternative means of livelihood.3
Rainfall is low and the soil is poor in the region, severely limiting agriculture. Most
agricultural activities in the area are basically at a subsistence level, with cotton the
only cash crop (Ogutu 1988). The cotton industry, however, collapsed many years
ago and does not offer a viable alternative to fishing.
In the backdrop of this escalation of fishing effort, the question of resistance to
exit or willingness to accept compensation to quit the Kenyan fisheries of Lake
Victoria is pertinent. The remainder of this paper uses data collected from the
Kenyan side of Lake Victoria to address this issue.
Even though exit is not the only feasible management strategy for Lake Victoria
fisheries, the paper focuses on it for two reasons. First and foremost, exit will be a
key component of any management strategy for these fisheries, as the overfishing
taking place indicates that the current level of effort is suboptimal. Exit strategies
will be crucial to rationalize effort in community self-management that we think is the
best option for these fisheries. Secondly, the government (the current regulatory agency)
has failed to effectively enforce existing regulations on gear limitations, closed seasons
and areas, and trade in juvenile fish. This failure is attributable to a myriad of ob-
stacles, ranging from lack of resources and strong vested interests, to corruption and
lack of motivation. While exit will not remove these obstacles, it is relatively easier
and cheaper to control entry than enforce input and output regulations.
A Note on Data
In the task of reducing the depletion speed of vital stocks of resources, managers
frequently have to concentrate on the individual firms exploiting them. This requires
microdata, ideally at the individual vessel trip level. Such data were lacking for the
Kenyan fisheries of Lake Victoria, and available data were largely aggregate. Even
these were of highly suspect quality due to the sampling methods used in their gen-
eration and failure to record data on weekends and public holidays, among other
shortcomings. The importance of microdata for fishery management and the lack of
available data compelled us to collect our own. Data were collected through the ad-
ministration of a structured questionnaire from a sample of about 500 fishing units
exploiting the Kenyan fisheries of Lake Victoria. This sample was selected using
proportional purposive sampling to choose the landing beaches, and random sam-
pling to pick 10–15 fishing units from each of these.4 In terms of scope of coverage,
this produced a sufficiently large and representative sample.
Being the basic unit of production in fisheries, a “fishing unit” is used here to
refer to the vessel, its head, crew, and fishing gear. The head of the fishing unit was
the respondent to our questionnaire.5 The head of the fishing unit is the appropriate
sampling unit, as he is the decisionmaker and, in most cases, the owner of the vessel
and fishing gear. He is, therefore, likely to be relatively more resistant to exiting the
fisheries than other crew members. He is also the most appropriate to target for
3 This figure is obtained from Hoekstra et al. (1991).
4 There are five administrative districts sharing the lake on the Kenyan side, each with a different num-
ber of landing beaches. The number of beaches in the first stage sample from each district was deter-
mined by its share of the total number of beaches, estimated to have been 208 by the time of the survey.
Instead of random selection, the actual beaches from each district were picked purposively in order to
capture all sizes of beaches, in terms of the number of active fishing units based there, and other unique
features.
5 In this paper, the terms “skipper” and “captain” are used to refer to the head of the fishing unit.Fishermen Resistance to Exit Fisheries 203
forced or other forms of exit, since his departure would be accompanied by a reduc-
tion in other dimensions of effort (boat and gear). In addition, the number of boats is
a more significant determinant of fishing pressure than the number of “crew.”
Production-related data and other data were obtained on a daily basis from the
sample of fishing units for three staggered months (May, August, and November
1995). These months were chosen to capture different seasons as comprehensively
as possible. Data on technological parameters were taken as well.
Besides these data, information was obtained through interviews or personal
communication with various stakeholders in the fishery sector. These include Dis-
trict Fisheries Officers (DFOs), senior officials of Fisheries Department headquar-
ters, representatives of several Nile perch processing firms, and officials of the Lake
Basin Development Authority (LBDA) and OSIENALA (an NGO involved in the
protection of the lake ecosystem). Secondary data were obtained from the Fisheries
Department, the Kenya Marine and Fisheries Research Institute (KMFRI), govern-
ment statistical publications, and other publications.
In spite of two revisits to the same sampling units and substantial logistical dif-
ficulties, the survey response rate was high. An insignificant number of unit heads
declined to participate when initially selected and were replaced with other random
choices. Of the 526 fishing units initially included in the sample, 75.6% remained in
it until the end of the survey. The rest either migrated, ceased operations, were not
enumerated due to enumerator failure, or declined further participation. The use of
people known in the fishing villages as enumerators ensured a high degree of re-
sponse and cooperation.
The Long-run Entry Decision
Fishermen exploiting the Kenyan fisheries of Lake Victoria are in their current en-
terprise not because it is more profitable or desirable relative to other enterprises,
but because it is the only one accessible to them.6 Our survey indicates that about
70% of the fishermen took up fishing because it was their only source of income,
due to their lack of education and the unavailability of alternative employment
(table 1). Another 18% of the fishermen took up fishing naturally, either in accor-
dance with the dictates of family tradition or because of their proximity to the lake.
The relative ease of entry into the fishing sector has also played a substantial role in
attracting effort into these Kenyan fisheries, as table 1 further demonstrates.
It is remarkable that, in spite of the stock and crowding externalities engendered
by the open-access nature of these Kenyan fisheries, 68% of the heads of fishing
units in our sample indicated that they would like more people to fish in their fish-
ing areas.7 Generally, users of resources that are overexploited, owing to their “com-
mons” nature, are expected to be opposed to new competitors. Apparently, this is not
the case here. Could it be that there is no externality in these fisheries or that, if
present, it is not perceived by fishermen? Evidence returns an emphatic no to both
aspects of the question. An overwhelming majority of the fishermen (91%) affirmed
that catch per fishing unit had declined over the years. Moreover, about 62% of the
fishermen cited stock reductions, reduced species diversity, and fall in the average
size of fish caught as the changes they observed over time. In addition, depletion of
6 Table 1 and Oduor-Otieno et al. 1978.
7 It is noteworthy, however, that artisanal fishermen were engaged in frequent conflicts with trawlers be-
fore trawling was banned in 1989. Moreover, Oduor-Otieno et al. 1978 report that migrant fishermen
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fish stocks is the negative externality cited as the reason for opposing new entry by
the majority (72%) of the fishermen who responded. Other negative externalities
cited include social problems such as theft, disease outbreaks, and fights.
The reasons provided for preference of new entrants indicate that positive exter-
nalities associated with more fishermen joining a landing beach far outweigh the
negative ones. Thus, 79% of the fishermen who prefer more entrants do so because
more fishermen would contribute to the rapid development of the beach (table 2).
This development could be facilitated by the exchange of ideas and competition,
through contributions to beach and cooperative society by more fishermen, creation
of employment, and increased demand for other services. Specifically, fishermen are
aware that larger beaches attract more buyers and, thus, are associated with higher
fish prices and other benefits. These would more than compensate them for the re-
duced CPUE arising from increased effort.
A crucial implication of the findings of this section is that fishers are primarily
concerned with securing a (current period) means of livelihood, even if this is at the
expense of the fishery. This, furthermore, implies that if fishermen were to be pro-
vided with alternative or supplementary means of livelihood, not only would the en-
try rate be reduced, but the attitudes of fishermen towards competition and resource
health would also undergo change.
The Long-run Exit Decision
In spite of a general awareness among fishermen of the opportunity cost of remain-
ing in the fishing industry, labor turnover is not high. Reasons for this include the
relatively low risk of losing the fishing job, low overhead costs, and the possibility
of massive losses (following exit) for those with large investments in the fishing
sector, due to low second-hand prices for fishing equipment (Oduor-Otieno et al.
1978). It should be noted that the opportunity cost of remaining in the lake fisheries
for most fishermen is very low, particularly since the mid-1980s. High unemploy-
ment rates in the country, in general, and in the lake region, in particular, coupled
with the low agricultural potential of the area, have meant that the opportunity cost
of fishing for most fishermen is very low. In addition, positive fish price movements
Table 1
Reasons Cited by Fishermen for Joining the Fishing Enterprise
Percentage of
Reason Frequency Respondents
Only occupation/source of income and food 207 39.4
Lack of alternative employment 118 31.0
Ease of entry, as it requires no qualifications 114 21.7
Likes and enjoys fishing and being his own boss 31 5.9
Family tradition (father is/was a fisherman) 40 7.6
Lives next to the lake; fishing a way of life 57 10.8
Fishing is highly profitable, with daily cash income 11 2.1
As a temporary job 3 0.6
Persuaded to try it 5 1.0
Total* 586 120.1
Note: * The total is greater than 526 (the number of fishing units) because some respondents provided
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Table 2
Reasons Why Fishermen Would Like More Fishermen to Join Their Beaches
Reason Frequency Percentage *
Facilitate rapid development of the beach 281 78.9
Lake is not mine alone; not selfish 44 12.4
Improve the supply of fishing crew 32 9.0
Improve the security at the beach 10 2.8
To ensure I can also fish in their areas 6 1.7
Fishing industry needs more people 1 0.3
Other reasons 2 0.6
Total 376 105.7
Note: * This is the number of respondents citing a particular reason as a percentage of the 356 respon-
dents who desire more fishermen to join their beaches. Total percentage is greater than 100 because
some of the respondents gave more than one reason.
Source: Own field data, 1995.
Table 3
Average Ex-vessel Prices for Selected Species,
Lake Victoria (Kenya) (Constant 1990 Prices)
Annual  Average Ex-vessel Price, Kshs/kg
Fish Species 1970 1975 1980 1983 1985 1988 1991 1993 1995
Lates niloticus 6.48 8.60 6.06 2.84 2.93 4.07 10.02 11.58 10.85
  (Nile perch)
Tilapia niloticus — 15.17 15.02 11.33 10.41 13.24 7.09 11.05 10.76
  (Nile tilapia)
R. argentea 9.81 6.69 5.44 2.22 2.26 3.63 4.92 2.20 4.36
Haplochromis 6.48 6.35 4.71 2.51 6.01 5.23 5.80 7.51 6.37
Protopterus 7.71 10.96 8.90 6.43 7.53 5.38 7.71 27.57 11.02
Clarias 7.52 7.42 7.31 4.51 5.43 4.71 3.91 12.99 9.54
Mormyrus 5.90 8.26 6.45 3.90 4.27 13.46 8.51 15.47 7.96
Source: Compiled from various issues of Fisheries Annual Statistical Bulletin, Fisheries Department,
Kenya. The prices are deflated with the aid of a series of consumer prices for low-income people in
Nairobi (1990 = 100), obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial
Statistics Yearbook (various issues).
spurred by the expansion of fish processing and marketing, particularly since the
mid-1980s, have widened the gap between earnings in the fishing sector and outside
(table 3). This has entrenched the fishermen deeper into the fishing business. Given
this situation, the opportunity cost of leaving the fishing enterprise would be ex-
pected to be crucial in the exit decision.
The second-hand market for fishing vessels is rather small. Only 8% of the fish-
ing vessels in our sample had been previously used by the time they were purchased
by the current owners. In addition, there is a close correspondence between vessel
age distribution and the period the vessel has been in the possession of the current
owner. It appears, therefore, that there is hardly any exit from the fisheries, or that
exit generally occurs after the stock of fishing capital has depreciated completely.
The small size of this market implies low demand, and therefore, price, for second-Ikiara and Odink 206
hand fishing equipment. Imperfect malleability of capital could be a significant vari-
able in firm exit decisions.
In this section, we develop a model of fisherman resistance to quitting the
industry that helps to understand the role of opportunity cost, imperfect capital
malleability, and other factors in the exit decision. In one of the survey ques-
tions, heads of fishing units were asked a question akin to the willingness to ac-
cept (WTA) questions posed in the valuation of nonmarket environmental goods
or services: What is the minimum salary (per month) would you be willing to
accept to quit fishing? This measure is comparable to what Gautam, Strand, and
Kirkley (1996) refer to as “fishermen satisfaction bonus.” They define it as the
amount of money that a fisherman would have to be paid to leave the fishery
and assume another occupation. While there is a lump-sum measure, ours is a
monthly salary whose termination date is not specified. It is this “fisherman re-
sistance to exit,” which we label as WTA subsequently, that we explain in our
model. Even though biases were not as elaborately controlled for as in contin-
gent valuation (CVM) studies, responses to this question are reasonable esti-
mates of fishermen resistance to quitting the industry.
We believe that the estimates are reasonable, because most of the fishermen
reported figures of WTA that were consistent with their fishing incomes and op-
portunity cost of fishing. Some, nevertheless, gave obviously exaggerated fig-
ures for strategic reasons. In fact, some of them said that they would not accept
anything to quit fishing. Others did not respond to this question at all. It is con-
ceivable that some would be willing to pay some money to secure continued ac-
cess into the fisheries.
About 92% of the respondents revealed a salary preference of more than zero,
ranging from Kshs 700 to 3 million (mean is Kshs 34,538 while the median salary is
Kshs 6,000). The remainder includes nonresponses and those who would not accept
anything to exit the fisheries. The genuineness of zero WTA responses is highly
doubtful, as is the possibility of negative WTA values. This is so because the fisher-
men would have already quit the fishery. Excluding the nonresponses and some of
the extreme cases, we use those cases that revealed a salary preference of Kshs
1,000–50,000 to model fisherman resistance to exit. This amounts to 89% of the en-
tire sample, or 97% of the sample revealing a positive salary. As an alternative to
this limit of dependent variable truncation, we excluded the extreme cases so that
the truncation is over 1,000–15,000. In this case, there are 428 cases, or 81% of the
total. Missing data for the dependent and explanatory variables imply a further re-
duction of observations.
Simple calculations show that the elicited WTA data are realistic. About 82% of
the fishing units fish for 21–31 days every month. Based on this, gross revenue re-
ceipts for the month of May 1995 averaged Kshs 19,012 per vessel and ranged from
1,202 to 189,487. Using the various schemes used in the sharing of vessel catch pro-
ceeds, weighted by the proportion of vessels using each of the schemes, we estimate
that a vessel owner’s net income is, on average, 47% of the gross revenue. This im-
plies that the vessel owner obtained an average net income of Kshs 0.47*19,012 =
8,936 in that month. Now, the proportion of fishing units whose owners received a
net monthly income of at least Kshs 6,000 (the median WTA) is 60%, indicating that
the WTA data are reasonable.
A Model of Fisherman Resistance to Exit
Let the latent variable, WTAi
*, represent the value reported for the “willingness to
accept” variable, before truncation. Then,Fishermen Resistance to Exit Fisheries 207
WTA x u u NID itt t
* ;; ( , ) = ′ + βσ 0 2 (1)
Following the above description of the dependent variable, the appropriate model is,
obviously, a truncated regression model. In a truncated regression model, the sample
used consists only of cases where observations for the dependent variable fall within
a specified range. Once the data are collected, through random sampling for in-
stance, noneligible cases are discarded so that information regarding their dependent
and independent variables is not used in the model. The truncated regression model
is derived from equation (1):
WTA x u WTA it t i = ′ +≤ ≤ β if , 1 000 50 000 * , (2)
Theory guides the choice of the explanatory variables (vector x). In fishery econom-
ics, a fishery’s total effort is usually assumed to adjust instantaneously to its profits
following Gordon (1954) and Smith (1968, 1969). Some adjustments to this basic
model have been made. Clark’s (1976) model, for instance, includes an adjustment
parameter relating the speed of effort adjustment to profits, while Clark (1980)
specifies different conditions for entry and exit decisions due to imperfect capital
malleability. Thus, fishing vessels are more willing to enter the fishery in response
to increasing profits than exit when profits decline (Smith 1968, 1969; Clark,
Clarke, and Munro 1979; Ward and Sutinen 1994). The manner in which expecta-
tions are formed also determines entry and exit from the fishing industry. With adap-
tive, myopic expectations (based on current values) fishing vessels enter the fishery
only when the stocks are in excess of their steady-state level. With rational expecta-
tions, however, vessels may enter the fishery even when the stocks are lower than
the steady-state level, as long as the fleet size is sufficiently small (Berck and
Perloff 1984). Moreover, exit may occur at higher stock levels in the rational model
relative to the adaptive expectations model.
These models suggest that current or expected profits from a specific fishery
relative to the employment alternatives open to the fishermen are the major determi-
nants of the entry-exit decisions. Ward and Sutinen (1994) applied this framework to
study the dynamics of the Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery. In their discrete choice
model, the probability of entry into or exit from this fishery is specified as a func-
tion of ex-vessel prices, operating costs, generalist versus specialist vessel opera-
tions, fixed vessel characteristics (such as vessel length and gross tonnage), and
other variables that describe the firm’s indirect profit function.
Ward and Sutinen (1994) find changes in harvesting costs and ex-vessel prices
to have equal but opposite effects on the probability of entry and exit of vessels in
the fishery. Moreover, vessels are found to be more willing to join the fishery when
profits increase than exit when profits decline. Existence of economic and noneco-
nomic inertia is supported. Crowding externality, measured by fleet size, is found to
induce exit and discourage entry into the fishery. Increase in shrimp abundance is
found to increase the probability of entry into the fishery. Fixed vessel characteris-
tics are also found to be statistically significant determinants of the probability of
entering the fishery. Further results suggest that experienced fishermen are more
likely to enter the fishery, while less experienced ones are more likely to fail and
exit once they have joined it. Market and biological variability variables are not sig-
nificant statistically, indicating that the magnitude of variability over the period un-
der analysis may not have been sufficient to induce fishermen response.
From the foregoing and the peculiarities of the fisheries under study, vector x in
equation (2) consists of the following explanatory variables:Ikiara and Odink 208
(i) Opportunity cost of exiting as measured by foregone income from fishing,
OPC. OPC is measured by the average daily catch value—not by the
monthly catch value—because, for one reason or another, vessels did not
fish for the same number of days in the month. OPC is a good measure of
the vessel owner’s opportunity cost of exiting because, as calculated above,
the vessel and gear owner is entitled to about 47% of the net value of daily
catch. Since the unit owner is the overall decisionmaker on the critical issue
of exit, his net income from fishing, Y, may be more illuminating than OPC.
The partial derivative of WTA with respect to Y is calculated by dividing the
derivative obtained with respect to OPC by 0.47. OPC is constructed using
May data only, since this is the month when fishermen responded to this
question. We assume that what they had not observed (August and Novem-
ber prices and catches) would not have been useful in their estimation of
opportunity cost. The derivative of WTA with respect to OPC is expected, a
priori, to have a positive sign.
(ii) Level of investment, INV. Due to imperfect malleability of capital, the
higher the investment a fisherman has in the fishery, the higher his resis-
tance to quitting (that is, high WTA) is expected to be, ceteris paribus. This
variable is captured by the estimated current (or resale) value of the
fisherman’s vessel and gear. The vessel and gear characteristics are, there-
fore, also expected to be important determinants of the resistance to quit-
ting.
(iii)The fishing experience (EX) and level of education (EDU) of the fisherman
are also likely to be important, as they determine his opportunity cost and
opportunities outside the fishing sector, respectively. EX is the number of
years the head of the fishing unit, who is taken to be the unit’s
decisionmaker, has worked as a skipper, not only with the current vessel,
but on other vessels as well. EDU = 1 if the head of the fishing unit has at
least Form IV level of education. It takes the value of zero otherwise. Esti-
mated coefficients for EX and EDU are, thus, expected to have positive and
negative signs, respectively.
(iv) The existence or nonexistence of alternative sources of income or occupa-
tions, ALTINC.8 ALTINC = 0 if the head of the fishing unit indicated no al-
ternative occupations either in the wet or dry season or both. ALTINC = 1,
otherwise. Heads of fishing units with alternative occupations or sources of
income are expected to have a lower WTA relative to those who rely on fish-
ing only. That is, a negative sign is expected for the coefficient estimated
for ALTINC.
(v) The effect of family tradition (captured by whether the respondent’s father
was a fisherman or not), TRAD. TRAD = 1 if the respondent’s father is/was
a fisherman and is 0 otherwise. Fishermen whose fathers were also fisher-
men are assumed to come from a family with a fishing tradition and are ex-
pected to be, all else remaining constant, relatively more resistant to exit-
ing. Thus, a positive sign is expected for TRAD’s estimated coefficient.
8 We agree with a review that “…individuals react to the amount of other income they have, not just
whether they have it” but, unfortunately, we do not have the data on the amounts of alternative income
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(vi) Whether a respondent is the owner of the vessel or not, OWNER. OWNER
takes the value of 1 if the head of the fishing unit is either the vessel’s
owner, co-owner, or renter and 0 if the head is an employee of the vessel
owner. Vessel renters are categorized as owners and not as nonowners, as
their production behavior is closer to the former than the latter. In terms of
entrenchment into the fishery, vessel renters are closer to vessel owners
than to employee skippers as they are, in fact, prospective vessel owners.
Vessel renting is, moreover, not widespread in these fisheries according to
our survey results. Vessel owners are expected to be more resistant to exit-
ing (higher WTA) relative to employed captains because they have a closer
(perhaps more intimate) relationship with the fishery relative to employees.
One could visualize a situation where fishermen start off as employees,
graduate into vessel renters as they gain experience and accumulate capital,
and finally become vessel owners. We posit that the intimacy with and en-
trenchment into the fishery increases with these graduations.
OLS estimators from the truncated sample will be biased and inconsistent be-
cause truncation distorts the scatter of observed points (Stewart 1991; Greene
1995). The OLS estimates are usually biased towards zero (Greene 1995).
Maximum likelihood estimation is, on the other hand, appropriate since the
likelihood function, whose log is maximized to yield estimates of β  and σ 2, re-
flects not only the probability of generating an eligible observation, but also the
distribution of the eligible observations (Stewart 1991). Maximum likelihood
is, consequently, used to estimate the likelihood function associated with equa-
tion (2).9 Starting values for this maximum likelihood estimation are obtained
from an OLS regression of the dependent variable on the regressors (Greene
1995). Estimation is done with the LIMDEP software that uses Newton’s
method and Olsen’s  transformation of the parameters for the truncated regres-
sion model (see Green 1995).
Results and Discussion
Estimation results differ substantially depending on the thresholds of truncation
chosen. In the model specification in which 1,000 ≤   WTAi
* ≤  50,000, only OPC
among the explanatory variables is statistically significant at the 10% level,
while in the alternative specification, OPC, EX, and OWNER are significant at
the same level. Moreover, the partial derivative of WTA with respect to OPC,
the variable of utmost importance, is higher in the first specification, at 0.70
compared to 0.33 in the specification in which 1,000 ≤   WTAi
* ≤  15,000. OPC is
more significant in the latter specification, being significant at the 5% level. All
of these variables have the expected signs. Given that we did not elaborately
control for possible biases in the WTA responses, upward (principally strategic)
bias is likely to be substantial. For this reason, estimation results pertaining to
the 1,000–15,000 WTA truncation range are deemed more realistic and are re-
ported in table 4.
That OPC is significant in both specifications highlights its importance in
the exit decision. As expected, opportunity cost, in terms of foregone fishing
income, is the most critical factor in this decision. An increase by Kshs 10 of
9 Greene (1995, 1997), provides details on how the density, conditional mean, and log-likelihood func-
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the vessel owner’s daily net income from fishing, for example, would increase
his resistance to exiting the fisheries by Kshs 7; that is, he will require Kshs 7
more per month to accept to quit, ceteris paribus. The results suggest that fiscal
measures, such as a tax on landings that reduce the net revenue owners of fish-
ing firms receive from the fishing enterprise, could reduce their resistance to
exiting the fishing sector. One way in which this information could be used is if
individual catch quotas could be determined for each vessel and an annual fee
imposed for these quotas. The revenue generated in this way could be used to
buy back the quotas, and, therefore, the right to fish, from those with relatively
lower resistance to exit. While such a strategy would facilitate compensated
exit, regulatory capacity for the administration of such a scheme is currently
lacking.
The level of investment in the industry appears not to influence the exit de-
cision in Kenya’s Lake Victoria fisheries. There is, therefore, no support for the
common argument that capital malleability increases fisherman resistance to
exit the fishery sector. This is, in fact, not surprising given that most of the
fishermen use small, fairly old canoes and cheap gear technology, including
homemade fishing nets.
The basic model in which profitability alone is the determinant of entry-
exit decisions is, therefore, supported for these fisheries. This has significant
implications for management. A management strategy aimed at the reduction of
the number of harvesters in these fisheries only needs to reduce the level of
profits. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that family tradition presents
no inertia to exit.
Like Ward and Sutinen (1994) found for the Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery,
less experienced fishermen are more likely to exit from the Kenyan fisheries of
Lake Victoria, too. Fishing experience of the head of the fishing unit, EX, is
highly significant (at the 1% level of significance) and has a high partial de-
rivative, 34.9. Thus, all else being equal, a one-year increase in the experience
of the head of a fishing unit increases his WTA (that is, resistance to quitting the
fisheries) by Kshs 35. This suggests that the economic value of a year’s experi-
Table 4
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Determinants of Fisherman
Willingness to Accept (WTA) Compensation to Exit the Fisheries
Variable Coefficient ∂ E[WTA|x]/∂ xa Std. Error t-ratio
Constant 3,636.4000** 2,186.9000 712.87 5.10
OPC 0.5529** 0.3325 0.27 2.07
INV 0.0002 0.0001 0.00 0.25
EX 57.9990** 34.8810 22.50 2.58
EDU 699.6100 420.7500 521.47 1.34
ALTINC 283.0400 170.2200 479.91 0.59
TRAD -7.2364 -4.3520 420.70 -0.02
OWNER 834.3200* 501.7600 467.18 1.79
F 2,906.9000** 165.17 17.60
a These are the partial derivatives of expected WTA with respect to the vector x. They are computed at
the means of the x’s. All observations are used in the calculation of the means. *denotes statistical sig-
nificance at the 10% level. **denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. Truncated regression; de-
pendent variable = WTA (in Kshs per month); N = 396; iterations completed = 4; log L = –3,023.36;
lower limit for WTA = 1,000; upper limit = 15,000.Fishermen Resistance to Exit Fisheries 211
ence as a captain is Kshs 35 per month for the remaining lifetime. This result
underscores the role of fishing profitability in the exit decision, since more ex-
perienced fishermen are likely, all else equal, to perform better in the fishing
enterprise relative to less experienced counterparts. This result has important
policy relevance. A program aimed at retiring some fishermen from these fish-
eries, through compensation, would be much cheaper if targeted at less experi-
enced fishermen whose resistance to exit is relatively lower.10
Owner-headed vessels have a monthly WTA value that is, on average and all
else remaining the same, Kshs 502 higher than that of fishing units headed by
employed captains. In other words, owner-headed fishing units are 8.4% (evalu-
ated at the median WTA) more resistant to exit relative to those units headed by
employed skippers. The significance of this variable, coupled with insignifi-
cance of INV, suggests that it is not really the level of investment that influ-
ences the exit decision in these fisheries, but other effects of vessel ownership.
These include the closer relationship that vessel owners and renters may have
with the fishery as a result of a longer period of association with it.
It is not entirely surprising that variables capturing economic opportunities
outside the fishing sector (EDU and ALTINC) are not significant at all. As men-
tioned already, there are very limited opportunities outside the fishing industry
in the lake region. Moreover, of all the means of livelihood open to fishermen
in the lake region, fishing offers the best alternative in terms of relative earn-
ings. Lack of data on the level of alternative income precluded a more rigorous
testing of its effect on the exit decision. We believe, nevertheless, that the sus-
tainable use of the lake fisheries has an integrated development program of the
lake region as its key pillar. The revival of the cotton industry and initiation of
small-scale industrial projects would, for instance, generate incomes compa-
rable or higher than those available in the fishing sector, especially for less ex-
perienced fishermen. This would provide economic incentives for the less expe-
rienced fishermen to exit, leaving only the most experienced to continue fish-
ing. Such an integrated development program would complement that of retir-
ing the less experienced fishermen through compensation.
Summary and Conclusions
An emerging view is that to improve the management of fisheries, understand-
ing fishermen behavior is as important as, if not more important than, under-
standing fish behavior. In agreement with this reasoning, this paper has ana-
lyzed the long-run entry-exit decision. Results indicate that fishermen are in
their current enterprise not because it is more profitable or yields higher utility
relative to alternatives, but because alternatives are lacking. Of the alternatives
open to the fishermen, fishing offers relatively higher earnings. The fishery re-
source is, consequently, absorbing an increasing number of unemployed people
every year. The situation has been exacerbated by the relative ease of entry into
the fishing industry.
10 An anonymous reviewer has suggested that if more experienced fishermen are really more successful
in harvest performance, then perhaps buying out a more experienced fisherman could cost less than a
less experienced one in terms of getting more fisheries conservation per dollar. While this is an insight
that we appreciate, we are taking a more holistic approach to fisheries management than just conserva-
tion. Retaining the more experienced fishermen has efficiency benefits, which less experienced counter-
parts do not have. On balance, therefore, we feel that it may be cheaper to buy out the less experienced
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A striking finding regarding the issue of entry is that in spite of the “com-
mons” nature of these fisheries, more than two-thirds of the heads of fishing
units would welcome the entry of more fishermen! The reason for this “strange”
behavior is that the positive externalities associated with new entrants far ex-
ceed the negative ones. Positive externalities include beach expansion and an
associated increase in fish price, creation of demand for commercial and service
enterprises, and other development. The negative externalities are environmen-
tal, such as declining catch per unit effort, and social, such as theft and con-
flicts. A crucial implication of this finding is that fishers are primarily con-
cerned with securing a (current period) means of livelihood, even if this is at
the expense of the fishery resource. They would not mind if more fishermen
overexploit the fisheries, so long as they can create demand for consumer goods
and services, and thus create jobs at the beaches. An integrated development
program of the lake region that would create alternative employment opportuni-
ties would then obviously take some pressure off the fisheries. This is, conse-
quently, a major pillar of the sustainable exploitation of these fisheries.
This paper has used a simple WTA CVM framework to analyze the factors
that drive the exit decision in the Kenyan fisheries of Lake Victoria. The oppor-
tunity cost of exiting, fishing experience, and whether the skipper of a fishing
unit is its owner or just an employee of the owner, are the significant determi-
nants of unit resistance to exit from these fisheries. Thus, a Kshs 10 decrease in
the unit owner’s daily fishing income reduces his resistance by Kshs 7 per
month; a one-year decrease in the fisherman’s experience reduces his resistance
by Kshs 35 per month; while a skipper who is also the owner of the fishing unit
is, on average, 8.4% more resistant to exit compared to a hired skipper. We find
no support for the common argument that capital malleability increases fisher-
man resistance to exit the fishery sector.
The results emerging from our model have potent management implications.
They suggest that exit inertia usually associated with imperfect capital mallea-
bility and attachment to fishing (as a way of life and family tradition) is lack-
ing, or minimal, in these Kenyan fisheries. Consequently, all a management
strategy aiming at the rationalization of the number of harvesters needs, is the
use of fiscal and other instruments to reduce the level of profits accruing to the
harvesters. This would have the effect of forcing the less experienced and,
therefore, less successful fishermen out of fishing. It would also have a greater
chance of success if an integrated development program is initiated for the lake
region, as it would provide alternative means of livelihood.
References
Achieng, A.P. 1988.  Lake Victoria Fisheries and Fish Patogenes. Artisanal Fisheries of Lake
Victoria, Kenya; Options for Management, Production and Marketing, G.E.M. Ogutu,
ed., pp. 49–61. Proceedings of a workshop, held in Kisumu, Kenya.
Berck, P., and J.M. Perloff. 1984.  An Open-Access Fishery with Rational Expectations.
Econometrica 52(2):489–506.
Clark, C.W. 1976.  Mathematical Bioeconomics. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
_. 1980. Towards a Predictive Model for the Regulation of Fisheries. Canadian Journal of
Fisheries and Aquatic Science 37:1111–29.
Clark, C.W., F.H. Clarke, and G.R. Munro. 1979.  The Optimal Exploitation of Renewable
Resource Stocks: Problems of Irreversible Investment. Econometrica 47:25–47.
Fisheries Annual Statistical Bulletin, Kenya Fisheries Department. Various years. Nairobi.Fishermen Resistance to Exit Fisheries 213
Gautam, A.B., I. Strand, and J. Kirkley. 1996. Leisure/Labor Tradeoffs: The Backward-Bend-
ing Labor Supply in Fisheries. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
31:352–67.
Gordon, H.S. 1954. The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery.
Journal of Political Economy 62:124–42.
Greene, W.H. 1995. LIMDEP Version 7.0: User’s Manual. New York: Econometric Software,
Inc.
_. 1997.  Econometric Analysis (Third Edition). New Jersey: Prentice-Hall International,
Inc.
Hoekstra, T.M., A. Asila, C. Rabuor, and O. Rambiri. 1991. Report on a Census of Fishing
Boats and Gear in the Kenyan Waters of Lake Victoria. UNDP/FAO Regional Project for
Inland Fisheries Planning (IFIP), RAF/87/099-TD/26/91.
Ikiara, M.M. 1999. Sustainability, Livelihoods, Production and Effort Supply in a Declining
Fishery: The case of Kenya’s Lake Victoria fisheries. Published Ph.D. thesis, University
of Amsterdam, Faculteit der Economische wetenschappen en Econometrie.
International Financial Statistics Yearbook. Various issues. International Monetary Fund,
Washington.
Oduor-Otieno, M.L., R.S. Karisa, J.O.O. Odhiambo, and T.C.I. Ryan. 1978. A Study of the
Supply Function for Fish in the Waters of Lake Victoria and on the Kenya Coast. Work-
ing Paper No. 346: IDS, University of Nairobi.
Ogutu, G.E.M., ed. 1988.  Artisanal Fisheries of Lake Victoria, Kenya: Options for Manage-
ment, Production, and Marketing. Proceedings of a workshop held in Kisumu, Kenya.
Smith, V.L. 1968. Economics of Production from Natural Resources. American Economic Re-
view 58:409–31.
_. 1969. On Models of Commercial Fishing. Journal of Political Economy 77:181–98.
Stewart, J. 1991. Econometrics. New York: Philip Allan.
Ward, J.M., and J.G. Sutinen 1994. Vessel Entry-Exit Behavior in the Gulf of Mexico Shrimp
Fishery. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 76:916–23.
Witte, F., and W.L.T. van Densen, 1995.  Fish Stocks and Fisheries of Lake Victoria. Publish-
ing Ltd., Cardigan, UK: Sanara Publishing Ltd.